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Introduction 
One year after the formal end of the failed peace process which had been initiated by President Andres 
Pastrana in 1998, it is possible to "take stock" of the situation of conflict in Colombia and the prospects for 
the future. The government of President Alvaro Uribe, who took office on August 7, 2002, is seeking to 
end the conflict by fighting the terrorists to force them to negotiate. To reach this point required serious 
modifications in domestic and international politics. Pursuing this strategy will require ongoing changes in 
domestic politics, including in Colombian civil-military relations. 
Violence and War on Many Fronts 
While terrorism is clearly the greatest threat to Colombia, it is but the most serious manifestation of a 
general situation of violence, social and economic deterioration, and absence of the state in much of the 
country. Before citing some of the gory data, let me put a personal touch to this reality. The author 
participated with other Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) colleagues in a seminar in October 2002 
on the topic of national security and military strategy which was held at the Tequendama Hotel in 
downtown Bogota. In December the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) exploded two 
bombs at this hotel, but luckily with relatively modest results. The author, again with a CCMR team, while 
participating in a conference on the topic of national security in July 2002, went to dinner at the El Nogal 
club in Bogota. On 7 February, the day after the author departed from Bogota on the most recent CCMR 
trip, FARC set off a car bomb in the club's garage that killed 32 and injured 168. These relatively close 
brushes with terrorism are not exceptional; CCMR is not constituted of thrill seekers. It is just the way it is 
in Colombia today—it should be noted that Bogota is safer than most other Colombian cities, let alone the 
rural areas.  
I think the most balanced and objective document summarizing the current situation of violence and other 
pathologies is President Uribe government's so far unpublished National Security Strategy (La Seguridad 
de la Solidaridad: Politica de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica Bogota February 2003). Following are 
some of the data the document presents. In 2001, more than 2000 unarmed civilians were assassinated 
by terrorists (1060 by the guerrillas of the National Liberation Army [ELN] and FARC and 1028 by the 
paramilitaries.) In the same year 200,000 civilians were forced from their land due to threats and 
terrorism. In the first nine months of 2002, 121 politicians or public officials were assassinated, more than 
500 mayors threatened with death, and many have been forced to leave their towns thereby losing 
contact with their constituents.  
The terrorists have also focused on Colombia's infrastructure. Many roads, even between major towns, 
are unsafe due to guerrilla roadblocks. In 2001 the petroleum infrastructure suffered 170 attacks, costing 
the country $520 million. In the last 15 years the oil pipelines have suffered 950 attacks by the ELN and 
FARC. The electricity infrastructure has also suffered: since 2000, 1178 electric pylons have been 
destroyed. The drug traffic in Colombia is huge, and helps finance the terrorists of the left and right, and is 
connected to money laundering and arms traffic. There is, in short, a generalized situation of violence and 
social pathology.  
At his most recent briefing at the U.S. embassy in Bogota the author was informed very persuasively by 
the regional security officer that Bogota is the homicide capital of the world. The average per year of 
homicide in Colombia is 25,000. In addition, kidnapping in Colombia is not only a criminal enterprise, but 
like drug trafficking, is also a tool used by the terrorists. In 2001 more than 2000 Colombians were 
kidnapped by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries (1923 and 262 respectively.) Kidnapping is used not 
only for finance but also to intimidate the government in that those kidnapped include 145 political leaders 
and public officials, among them a presidential candidate (whom the author met during an earlier CCMR 
seminar), 16 mayors, 27 council members, a governor, and 18 deputies. Five deputies remain captive.  
In short, Colombia is a maelstrom of terrorist violence, homicide, kidnapping, drug and arms trafficking, 
and overall social and economic deterioration. Colombia's violence is abetted by a lack of any 
government presence in nearly half of Colombian territory. The violence perpetrated by terrorists and by 
the legitimate use of armed force is but a small part of the total violence within the Colombian society. 
Governmental Strategies and the Role of the United States 
In line with his campaign platform, when President Andres Pastrana took office in mid-1998 he embarked 
on a peace process with the ELN and the FARC. President Pastrana received support from the 
international community, including the U.N., EU, U.S. and other states towards this goal. Unfortunately, 
not only did the peace process go nowhere, it led to a very unfortunate situation. It was clear, to at least 
the author from the beginning, that the peace process with the FARC could not succeed. The FARC had 
absolutely nothing to gain from serious peace negotiations. While at their founding in the 1960s they may 
have had some element of ideology, by the 1990s and the end of the Cold War nothing remained but 
seeking for power and survival. There was nothing the Pastrana government could give them that they 
did not already have.  
In my view, the Pastrana government wasted four years, and maybe most serious, the ill-conceived 
peace process resulted in the growth of the paramilitaries. Since the state's security forces—the armed 
forces and the national police—were either not present or not allowed to deal with the guerrillas, 
paramilitary organizations grew as something like illegal vigilante bands to fill the vacuum. Ultimately they 
too came to depend on funding from the drug traffic and kidnapping. Much of the violence over the past 
three years or so has been due to battles for towns, transit routes, and supporters among the guerrillas 
and the paramilitaries. In the process, this total of approximately 25,000 terrorists, with something like 5% 
public support, has been able to hold Colombia, with a population of 42 million and armed forces and 
national police totaling 290,000, at ransom.  
Near the end of the Clinton Administration the U.S. government agreed to support what came to be called 
Plan Colombia. In line with this plan, the United States would provide $1.3 billion over two years in 
security assistance and development aid, the latter to include support for alternative crops and social 
assistance. This was a very polemic issue in the United States, both among the interested public and in 
the Congress, as the specter of "another Viet Nam" was continually raised. Consequently, legislation 
required that the security assistance could be used only in counter-drug training and equipment, and not 
for counter-terrorism. This was obviously not a sustainable distinction, and could be understood only in 
terms of the dynamics of U.S. domestic politics.  
The Election of Alvaro Uribe and New U.S. Government Policies 
By early 2002 it was obvious to all that the peace process was going nowhere. The ELN and FARC 
upped the pace of attacks on the security forces, blew up oil and electricity infrastructure, kidnapped 
public officials including deputies and a presidential candidate, and killed hundreds of unarmed civilians 
who were unfortunate enough to be caught in the crossfire with the paramilitaries. In this context, a 
political outsider, Alvaro Uribe, running on a law and order platform, captured the public imagination and 
rode to victory in an unheard of first round election in May 2002. There was, in short, a major political shift 
due to the population's awareness that peace could not come through negotiations prior to a serious 
struggle with the terrorists. The Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress, in the vastly different context 
of post- September 11, was also ready for a change. Consequently, in mid-2002 the Congress approved 
the so-called "expanded authorities" whereby U.S. supplied training and equipment could be used not 
only in counter-drug efforts but also counter-terrorism. The relations with the United States have 
continued to strengthen with frequent meetings between Colombia and U.S. officials including President 
Uribe visiting President Bush in Washington twice and Secretary of State Colin Powell visiting Bogota in 
early December 2002. The President's budget for 2004 includes some $565 million for Colombia, and the 
negotiations to resume the air bridge denial, suspended since April 2001, were completed in early 
February of this year. The United States is also now providing training and other support to guard the 
major petroleum pipeline, which is indicative of the expanded U.S. involvement and support for the Uribe 
government.  
The Uribe Government's Strategy and Civil-Military Relations 
It must be emphasized that Colombia is a democracy and has been since at least 1958. Consequently, 
the military does not determine policy in Colombia. However, for at least four decades the civilian 
politicians have left the whole area of security to the public security forces. The armed forces have 
traditionally been trained, equipped, and oriented towards traditional territorial defense; and not towards 
fighting guerrillas. During the Pastrana administration the situation was particularly complicated since the 
armed forces could not initiate actions against the guerrillas in certain regions. Consequently, as noted 
above, the paramilitaries emerged to fill a vacuum left by the public security forces.  
Today the Uribe government sees the biggest problem in Colombia as the complete absence of the state 
in huge areas of the country, and a shortage of state legitimacy due to the state's lack of response to 
armed insurgents as well as common criminals. To achieve what the government refers to as effective 
sovereignty and democratic security, they have elaborated the first-ever national security strategy. To 
achieve their goals they have set a series of tasks which include: strengthening the military and police 
forces, reform of the conscription service, strengthening the intelligence system, promoting civilian 
cooperation, destroying the logistic and financial systems of the terrorists, and protection of the economic 
infrastructure.  
Through its national security strategy the Uribe government seeks to establish the presence and 
legitimacy of the state. That is, it is working on the effectiveness of the state by identifying solutions to the 
multiple problems of Colombia. Uribe's administration is seeking to be effective by actually implementing 
these plans. It is doing this through aggressively pushing for constitutional reforms that will diminish the 
size of congress, free up resources to fight the war, and eliminate some legal restrictions on state actions. 
These reforms are being pursued in a democratic manner, which also seeks to increase the legitimacy of 
the state. To implement the security dimensions in particular the public security forces will be expanded to 
390,000 over 18 months. The government plans to increase the defense budget by 25%, and is finding 
the money by drastically cutting back on government spending in other areas.  
The government is discovering that it is not easy to change strategies, to in fact make legal changes and 
aggressively fight the terrorists. President Pastrana attempted legal reforms, including in the security and 
defense arena, and was not successful. It remains to be seen if the Uribe government will be more 
successful in holding a referendum, and winning it, by mid-2003. The arena of civil-military relations is 
complicated. As noted above, while Colombia is a democracy, in fact the civilians have left all issues of 
national security to the armed forces and the police. Today, in seeking to actively pursue the fight against 
the guerrillas, the Uribe government is encountering some passive resistance from the military in regard 
to reforms in civil-military relations. So far, however, relying on U.S. support, and developing momentum, 
the government has been reasonably successful in pursuing its strategy of military reform and fighting the 
guerrillas.  
The Immediate Future 
Today, six months into his four year term of office, the Uribe administration has taken the initiative 
politically and militarily. Already, in late January, the government began negotiations with the 
paramilitaries. It seems likely that the government will also negotiate with the relatively isolated and weak 
ELN. If these negotiations are successful, then the government can direct greater attention to the FARC. 
The problem is, the FARC knows that this is a do or die situation and will put all of its efforts into stopping 
the government's momentum. They know that the U.S. government is committed to Uribe, and that the 
Europeans are less ingenuous than previously regarding the value of negotiations. The FARC will, 
therefore, do everything it can to stop President Uribe and those around him to halt the momentum. 
Indeed, they prepared a major attack on him at the time of his inauguration on August 7, 2002, but most 
of the rockets did not ignite. The FARC has received training in urban terrorism from foreigners, including 
the IRA. The recent El Nogal bombing is precisely the kind of attack through which they probably plan to 
stop, through death or intimidation, Uribe and his government. Obviously, a government is more than one 
man. But the big question is: could the programs and strategy of the Uribe government persist without the 
leadership of Uribe himself? It took this long before a politician understood what was involved in the 
Colombian conundrum, and was elected by the people to deal with it. This is an extremely critical time in 
Colombian history. The state will either successfully assert its sovereignty over the country, and continue 
to consolidate democracy in all areas including civil-military relations, or the sad litany of terrorism and 
homicide will continue.  
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